My evaluation of the Japan-China Agreement of 18 June 2008:
From:
` From `Sea of Confrontation` to `Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship`? - Japan facing China in the East China Sea`, Japan Aktuell 3, 2008, pp. 27-51. http://www.giga-hamburg.de/japan-aktuell
Direct:
pp. 43-45:
4.3 An Evaluation of the Agreement of 18 June 2008
The document of 18 June 2008 is surprisingly
short and consists of three parts.
In Part 1 the general point is made that both
countries have agreed to cooperate
in the ECS in order to turn it into a ‘Sea of
Peace, Cooperation and Friendship’.
This cooperation – in the absence of an
agreed-upon maritime border – is to
be without prejudice to the legal position of
either party. Both countries will
continue negotiations. The agreement is
therefore only a first step.
The second part, like the third part, is
referred to as an understanding
(ryokai in Japanese; liangjie in Chinese). In the former, the two sides agree
to
joint development (ky¯od¯okaihatsu, gongtong
kaifa) in an area defined by seven
measures of longitude and latitude as a first
step. The agreement has a map
attached which shows the area. The area is
south of the Longqing field and,
as far as this author is aware, has not been
developed by China so far. Both
sides declare their willingness to select
sites for joint development in this area
through consultations and to conclude a bilateral agreement to implement joint
development. Of particular importance for
Japan is that the two sides will also
consult about other areas outside of the above area for joint development.
The third part illustrates a fascinating
attempt to bridge the gap between the
two countries’ positions on the national
sovereignty over the area of the Chunxiao
field. The title of the Chinese version
refers to the participation of Japanese
legal persons in the development of the
Chunxiao oil and gas field in accordance
with Chinese laws. The Japanese version is
merely titled ‘Understanding on the
development of Shirakaba (Chinese name:
Chunxiao) oil and gas field’ but then
contains the same wording. The important
point here is that China wanted to
make clear its unchanged position on its
title to the field by insisting on the
omission of ‘joint’ and speaking of
‘welcoming’ Japanese companies to participate
in the exploration and exploitation in
accordance with Chinese laws regarding
cooperation with foreign enterprises. Vice
ForeignMinisterWu Dawei reinforced
this point shortly afterwards when he
declared that the cooperative development
of the Chunxiao oil and gas field by Chinese
and Japanese enterprises was
different from the ‘joint development of the
East China Sea’. He added that
the biggest difference was that in the case
of the Chunxiao field, development
must be conducted in accordance with Chinese
laws, a requirement which thus
indicated that the sovereign rights over the
field belonged to China. And just
to make it even clearer, he referred to the
previous cooperation by Unocal and
Royal Dutch Shell in the development of
Chunxiao as being exactly the same
case (CI 2008b). This latter point was also
emphasised by foreign minister Yang
Jiechi on 24 June in refutation of a Japanese
official’s remark that it was not
important whether it was called ‘joint
development’ or not (FMPRC 2008b).
The following points can be made about this
three-part agreement:
• The agreement does not amount to any substantive progress concerning
the delimitation of the maritime border in
the ECS. However, politically
speaking, it is a success that such an
agreement could be concluded despite the
continuing impasse over how the border should
be delimited, and it highlights
a continuous improvement of the bilateral relationship
since 2005. At the
same time, the Japanese side can claim that
the agreement indicates implicit
Chinese acknowledgment of the median line
because the defined zone for
joint development
approximately straddles this line and differentiates between
Chunxiao and the joint development zone. In
exchange, the Japanese side had
to accept a text version and Chinese
unilateral statements which imply that
Chunxiao is under Chinese sovereignty.
Furthermore, the Japanese side could
not get the Chinese to accept the inclusion
of the Tianwaitian and Duanqiao
fields, although that had been – together
with the Longqing field – one of
the Japanese demands. Instead, Japan had to
satisfy itself with the statement
in Part 2 that both sides will continue
consultations on joint development
in other parts of the ECS, which can be
interpreted by the Chinese as being
between the median line and the Okinawa
Trough. However, the Chunxiao
field has the more ‘iconic’ value for Japan.
In the case of Longqing, both sides
agreed to exclude it because of the Korean
factor (Yomiuri Shinbun 21/6/
2008).
• The agreement is merely an agreement on principles, and the implementation
of Part 2 and 3 will require further
difficult negotiations and in Japan’s case
a treaty which will have to be ratified by
the Diet, potentially exposing the
whole venture to the vagaries of party
politics (for example, as a result of
the Democratic Party’s majority in the Upper
House). Domestic opposition
in China against the agreement has also already
been raised, and the implementation
will depend on the strength of Hu Jintao’s
regime and the overall
Japanese-Chinese relationship (Yomiuri Shinbun 20/6/2008). The agreement
on Chunxiao is hardly of any economic value
to Japan since the field is fully
developed and Japan’s share and proportional
profits can only be symbolic.
So far, Teikoku Oil has declared its interest
in participating in the Chunxiao
field (which is next to the area on the
Japanese side of the median line for
which it received a license in 2005) and
Nippon Oil Corp. has declared its
interest in the joint development zone (CI 2008c).