`The future of the Japanese-Chinese relationship – The case for a grand political bargain`, Asia-Pacific Review vol 16 no 2 November 2009 , pp. 55-74

Japanese version: 読売Quarterly, January 2010

Excerpt:

p. 55

Compared with the strained relationship during the Koizumi era, Japanese-

Chinese relations today seem to prove that despite many bilateral problems, a

solution can always be found. This attitude is too complacent as a closer

examination of the three main disputes shows: the history-related issues, the

territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. Bilateral agreements,

understandings, or protracted negotiations may provide temporary relief but

may turn out to be very costly in the long run to Japan’s national interests

and to regional stability while time is not on Japan’s side in view of the

shifting comprehensive power relationship between the two countries. Instead,

Japan should clarify its position in the Japan–US–China triangle, reform its

economy, strengthen its Asian policy and sort out its priorities concerning the

three main problems by striking a grand bargain.

pp. 71-73:

Policy suggestions

After clarifying its position and policies on the regional/global as well as economic

frameworks, the following policies towards the three main disputes with

China would be possible for Japan if China plays its part as well:

. Finding closure on the history issue is a distant goal. Trying to alleviate the

various legacies arising from Japan’s past, for example, by removing the abandoned

chemical shells, showing a less legalistic approach to civil compensation

demands, promoting youth exchanges, etc., can improve the situation in the

medium term. Coming to terms with the past is more than simply issuing

some apologies or having proved its peaceful development since 1945, but is

an ongoing process of truth seeking and contrition which elevates Japan’s

moral standing, and should make the younger generation proud of its country.

The Hu Jintao leadership has now publicly acknowledged that Japan has delivered

several apologies and pursued peaceful development, but there is no room

for Japanese complacency as the list of history-related issues shows. A sincere

Japanese attitude may even become a model for China to come to terms with the

dark sides of its own recent history.

. On its part, the Chinese government has to continue to recognise Japan’s apologies

(even if they have sometimes been less than convincing), and Japan’s

pursuit of a peaceful diplomacy since 1945. Moreover Beijing has to undo the

consequences of having in the past encouraged, or at least tolerated, an anti-

Japan mood, to show positive leadership in directing public opinion towards

today’s Japan and not the Japan of pre-1945, and to resist any temptation in

invoking an anti-Japan mood to achieve its foreign and security policy. The

different social and political systems of both countries make reconciliation difficult,

particularly against the background of competition and rivalry. Agreeing

on a joint historical text book will be very problematic for a long time to come,

but at least juxtaposing the perspectives of both sides in a single book would be

an achievement. Both governments still have too much influence over textbooks

(the Chinese government even more than the Japanese); and regarding bilateral

history commission, Chinese historians still consider themselves too much as

official representatives, rather than representative, of their discipline.

. Whereas the history issue can poison the bilateral atmosphere, damage Japan’s

legitimacy and moral position bilaterally and internationally, and thus make

addressing the other major problems even more difficult to resolve, the Taiwan

problem and the ECS disputes are more acute and severe. On Taiwan the Japanese

decision-makers have to consider whether antagonising China with their ambiguity

over Taiwan’s status, independence efforts, and security, achieves really

worthwhile leverage. The current Guomindang-headed Taiwan government is

making surprising approaches to Beijing and the island’s economic dependence

(particularly in overcoming the deep recession caused by the economic crisis) is

increasingly limiting the future options of Taiwan. The red line for Japan should

be the use of force to change the status quo and the freedom of sea lanes. Petty

leverage can only divert China’s attention from this fundamental Japanese interest,

and delegitimise, in China’s eyes, Japan’s national and alliance countermeasures.

These interests are, ultimately, also the red lines for the US, for whom the

PRC is politically and economically becoming increasingly important, despite its

attachment to maintaining its predominance in Asia. Such legitimate interests can

also be explained to China bilaterally.

. The most difficult issue is turning the ECS into a Sea of Peace and Cooperation.

Japan has to envisage a move away from bureaucratic and legal tactics to a

grand political package deal which includes Japanese compromises on the

Senkaku Islands and on the median line, in order to pull a dangerous thorn

out of the side of the relationship, and to pursue the risk-free exploitation of the

many natural resources of the ECS. Access to a secure EEZ with maximum size

should be considered the most important goal. The Japanese government could

put a clarified position on Taiwan into a grand political package deal. Japan’s

position would be strengthened by integrating Korea into the delimitation of

the EEZ.

These are politically very difficult compromises for Japan and they will make

sense only if the other framework issues are adequately addressed. But the alternative

may be for Japan to be forced to make the same compromises later, but

without receiving much in return from China. Japan has to free itself from

ballast in order to pursue, with greater clarity and legitimacy, its interests in a

world which is changing fast and dramatically as a result of China’s growing comprehensive

power. It has to be able (economically, politically and militarily) to

credibly defend these interests as its own, while trying to make them overlap

with those of as many other countries as possible. China, on the other hand,

should also show willingness to compromise. It cannot be in China’s interests

to heighten tensions in Asia (North Korea is already doing enough damage to

China’s security interests in Northeast Asia!), to create a regional arms race and

to provide fodder for the perception of the “China threat.” Japan is an extremely

useful partner in helping China to cope with the many problems which will

increasingly challenge the leadership. Too many Chinese are underestimating

the goodwill which many Japanese still have towards China, but this goodwill

is perishable and the young Japanese need to have a chance of inheriting it

from their elders! A new government which is not dominated by the LDP might

provide both sides with another chance.